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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 07-2948

PAUL A. COURTEAU,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-00659)
District Judge: The Honorable Joseph E. Irenas

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 27, 2008

Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 25, 2008 )

OPINION

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Paul Courteau appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the United States of America. We will affirm.

I.
In 1981, a Rhode Island jury convicted Courteau of a robbery involving a United
States mail truck. He was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment and, after multiple grants
and revocations of parole, was released from prison in 1994. In 1998, another individual
confessed to the robbery and informed the State of Rhode Island that Courteau was not
involved. The State vacated Courteau’s 1981 robbery conviction in 1999.
On January 15, 2002, Courteau, who was at the time serving a sentence at F.C.I.
Fairton on an unrelated conviction, filed a pro se complaint (the “First Complaint”)
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671
et seq., seeking damages for the alleged torts committed by a United States Postal
Inspector, Raoul Vargas, during the investigation that led to the vacated 1981 robbery
conviction.1 The District Court screened the First Complaint pursuant to the screening
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The complaint alleged that
Vargas falsified a report that pointed to [Courteau] as one of the
perpetrators of the robbery when in fact, Mr. Vargas had no such
information. . . . The testimony and reports generated by [Vargas] caused
the wrongful conviction of [Courteau] for the aforesaid robbery. . . . Due to
[Courteau’s] wrongful conviction, he was forced to spend approximately
thirteen years in prison, which amounted to unlawful confinement.
(App. at A115.) Courteau claimed that, through Vargas, the United States had committed
the following torts: assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, wrongful
persecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional
distress, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, defamation of character (libel and/or
slander), and false reports to authorities. (Id. at A116.)
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mechanism for pro se prisoner complaints found in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,2 and sua sponte
dismissed it for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In its January
31, 2002 opinion, the Court explained that (1) the United States was immune under the
doctrine of sovereign immunity as to the intentional torts asserted against it because
Vargas was not a law enforcement officer and (2) Courteau had not adequately pled the
remaining claims.
Courteau promptly retained an attorney and filed a second complaint (the “Second
Complaint”) against the United States on February 14, 2002. The Second Complaint was
nearly identical to the First Complaint; the only noteworthy difference was that it
identified Vargas as “an investigative or law enforcement officer within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. [§] 2680(h).” (App. at A24.) Significantly, because Courteau was now
represented by counsel, the Second Complaint was served on the United States without
first being screened by the District Court under § 1915A. The United States asserted 14
affirmative defenses in its answer, but res judicata was not among them.
Following limited discovery, the United States moved for summary judgment on
the ground that the Second Complaint was barred by res judicata, more popularly known
today as “claim preclusion.” The District Court granted the motion and entered judgment
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The statute requires district courts to “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any
event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
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in favor of the United States, finding that Courteau was not prejudiced by the United
States’ failure to raise the defense of res judicata in its answer and concluding that the
January 31, 2002 dismissal constituted a final judgment on the merits such that the
Second Complaint was barred. This timely appeal followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review a district court’s decision to permit a party to assert a previously unpled
affirmative defense by way of a motion for summary judgment for abuse of discretion.
Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College, 989 F.2d 1360, 1374 (3d Cir. 1993). A district court’s
application of the doctrine of res judicata is a question of law over which we exercise
plenary review. Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 248
(3d Cir. 2006).
III.
Courteau argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it permitted the
United States to move for summary judgment on the ground of res judicata even though
the defense was not pled in its answer. Alternatively, Courteau argues that, assuming
arguendo the District Court properly considered the res judicata argument, the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the United States on that ground.
Although “[p]arties are generally required to assert affirmative defenses early in
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litigation, so they may be ruled on, prejudice may be avoided, and judicial resources may
be conserved,” Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2002), a district court
may permit a defendant to raise an unpled defense by way of a post-answer motion so
long as it is raised “at a pragmatically sufficient time, and [the plaintiff] was not
prejudiced in its ability to respond.’” Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 864 (3d Cir.
1991) (brackets in original) (quoting Lucas v. United States, 807 F.2d 414, 418 (5th Cir.
1986)). See also Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 210 n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The purpose
of requiring the defendant to plead available affirmative defenses in his answer is to avoid
surprise and undue prejudice by providing the plaintiff with notice and an opportunity to
demonstrate why the affirmative defense should not succeed.”); Cetel v. Kirwan Fin.
Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 506 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that “affirmative defenses can be
raised by motion, at any time (even after trial), if plaintiffs suffer no prejudice”).
The District Court concluded, and we agree, that Courteau was not prejudiced by
the United States’ failure to raise the defense of res judicata in its answer. Indeed,
Courteau did not allege prejudice in his brief opposing the motion for summary judgment
and does not allege prejudice in his brief on appeal. Moreover, it does not appear that the
United States’ failure to include the defense in its answer was due to anything other than
the fact that it was not aware of the First Complaint when it filed its answer to the Second
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Complaint.3 Under the circumstances presented, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in permitting the United States to raise the affirmative defense of res judicata in
a post-answer motion for summary judgment.
Having determined that the issue of res judicata was properly before the District
Court, we turn to the res judicata effect, if any, that dismissal of the First Complaint had
on the filing of the Second Complaint. For res judicata to apply, “a defendant must
demonstrate that there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving
(2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of
action.” Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991).
It is well settled that a “[d]ismissal for failure to state a claim is a final judgment
on the merits for res judicata purposes.” Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 169 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Federated Dep’t Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3 (1981)
(discussing the effect of a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). Courteau
makes much of the fact that the District Court dismissed the First Complaint pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A as opposed to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but this is a distinction without
a difference: the legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim
pursuant to § 1915A is identical to the legal standard employed in ruling on 12(b)(6)
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As noted above, the District Court sua sponte dismissed the First Complaint for
failure to state a claim pursuant to the screening mechanism of § 1915A. There is nothing
on the docket to suggest that the United States was ever served with this complaint prior
to, or following, its dismissal.
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motions. See, e.g., Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
The second and third prongs are also easily satisfied. Courteau and the United
States are the only two named parties in both complaints and the Second Complaint is
practically a verbatim recital of the First Complaint. Although the Second Complaint
specifically identifies Vargas as “an investigative or law enforcement officer within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. [§] 2680(h),” we agree with the District Court that a party “does
not get another bite at the apple simply by citing to an additional statute in the [Second]
Complaint.” (App. at A10.) If Courteau disagreed with the Court’s disposition of the
First Complaint, he should have moved for reconsideration or filed an appeal rather than
file a second action.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.
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